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This article examines the Public Act of Acknowledgment of International Responsibility and Recovery of the Memory of María Claudia García de Gelman held in 
the Uruguayan parliament on 21 March 2012 through a theoretical framework of memory narratives. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ordered Uru-
guay to hold the Public Act as part of its February 2011 ruling in the Gelman v. Uruguay case, which condemned its failure to investigate and prosecute indi-
viduals responsible for disappearing María Claudia García de Gelman and illegally adopting her baby daughter Macarena, while denying her knowledge of her 
true identity for over two decades. The Public Act was a memorialising event intended as an act of reparation, which also triggered irruptions of memory in Uru-
guay, resurfacing memory debates and discussions about the recent past of dictatorship and violence. The Public Act exposed once again the continued an-
tagonisms between memory narratives of violence and justice that have existed in the Uruguayan political and social landscape since 1985. While the Act was 
an expression of the “state terrorism” narrative, its unfolding resulted in the resurfacing of narratives of “war” and “two demons” in the social and political are-
nas and of new interpretations of these narratives in light of events and politics in 2012.
This place is the only physical connection with history 
It is the only place where I was with my mother […] 
It is the only little piece of truth I have.1
In 1973, Uruguay fell to the wave of military takeovers that 
had engulfed most of South America – starting in 1954 
with Paraguay – and that were ideologically inspired by the 
national security doctrine dominant in the region at the 
time. The Uruguayan dictatorship remained in place until 
1985. The crimes perpetrated against the Gelmans were not 
isolated acts, but formed part of a systematic policy of 
repression and human rights violations unleashed against 
Uruguayan citizens – targeting them even outside of the 
country through Operación Cóndor.2 The Uruguayan dic-
tatorship penetrated people’s public and private lives, sub-
mitting society to terror and installing a culture of fear 
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1 All translations from Spanish are the author’s 
own unless otherwise stated. Words by Macarena 
Gelman cited in “Este lugar es el pedacito de verdad 
que me queda”, dijo Macarena Gelman”, 21 March 
2012, http://www.presidencia.gub.
uy/Comunicacion/comunicacionNoticias/
macarena-gelman-placa-homenaje-maria-claudia 
(accessed 31 December 2013).
2 Operación Cóndor (Operation Condor) was a 
secret transnational network of intelligence agencies 
and counterinsurgency operations set up in the 
mid-1970s by the military dictatorships of 
Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and 
Brazil to target political opponents who had sought 
refuge or gone into exile in neighbouring countries. 
For more information on Cóndor see Dinges 
(2004).
Macarena Gelman uttered these words on 21 March 2012, 
when Uruguay publicly and officially acknowledged its 
responsibility for the crimes committed against her and her 
family: the illegal detention in 1976 and later disappearance 
of her Argentine mother, María Claudia García Irureta-
goyena de Gelman, and the cover-up of her own fate for over 
twenty years. In fact, Macarena recovered her real identity 
only in March 2000, at the age of twenty-three, after a relent-
less search by her grandfather, Argentine poet Juan Gelman.
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(Sondrol 1992). The regime used brutality and violence on 
a massive scale to repress the guerrilla group known as the 
Movimiento de Liberación Nacional-Tupamaros (MLN-T, 
Tupamaros National Liberation Movement) as well as all 
forms of social and political opposition. Repression had a 
very high human and social cost, with approximately two 
hundred people disappeared, an estimated six thousand 
long-term political prisoners, twenty-six extrajudicial 
executions, thousands of exiles, and countless instances of 
torture and illegal detentions (Rico 2008).
This article focuses on a recent occurrence, the 2012 Public 
Act of Acknowledgment of International Responsibility 
and Recovery of the Memory of María Claudia García de 
Gelman (Acto público de reconocimiento de responsabili-
dad internacional y recuperación de la memoria de María 
Claudia García, hereafter the Public Act), which was 
ordered by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as 
part of the 2011 Gelman ruling. The article discusses how 
this act of remembrance and reparation for the victims, 
held in the Uruguayan parliament, triggered the resurfac-
ing of memory debates relating to Uruguay’s recent dicta-
torship and violent past.
Memory studies scholar Alexander Wilde identified 
“irruptions of memory” in Chile with “public events that 
break in upon […] national consciousness, unbidden and 
often suddenly” and evoke a political past still very much 
“present in the lived experience of a major part of the popu-
lation” (1999, 475). According to Wilde, these irruptions 
brought to the fore the existence of “an arena of deeply 
divided public discourse, shot through with contending and 
mutually exclusive collective representations of the past” 
(1999, 475). Wilde’s notion can be applied to Uruguay where 
over the past three decades the memories of the country’s 
recent past continue to be very much present and generate 
long-lasting societal discussions and debates. This article 
analyses how the Public Act caused the irruption into public 
discourse of latent and enduring tensions between diverse 
memory narratives of the dictatorship and its atrocities.
Numerous scholars have studied questions of memory in 
Uruguay (Achugar 2005; Allier 2010; Fried 2006; Marchesi 
2002; Roniger and Sznajder 1999), analysing a range of 
themes relating to the recent past including the social and 
cultural aspects of memory at the level of the state and civil 
society, the construction of the dictatorship’s collective and 
historical memory by different social and political actors, 
and the debates surrounding remembrance on dates of 
particular significance such as 20 May or 14 April. In this 
article, I propose a theoretical framework based on the 
notion of memory narratives that enables the identification 
and analysis of different interpretations of violence in Uru-
guay from their emergence in the 1970s and through their 
subsequent evolution. I then apply this theoretical frame-
work to the case study of the Public Act to demonstrate the 
endurance of memory debates in recent times.
Before and after the Public Act, the public arena and politi-
cal discourses in Uruguay were replete with conflicting 
memory narratives which were actualised and (re-)articu-
lated within the contemporary political context. Although 
the Public Act expressed the “state terrorism” narrative, 
other memory narratives of “war” and “two demons” also 
circulated in the public sphere, with the political opposi-
tion to the current government utilising them to reassert its 
own understanding of the past. The Public Act vividly 
recalled the pattern of crimes perpetrated in Uruguay. The 
Gelman case has played a particularly important role in the 
development of accountability in Uruguay since the late 
1990s, as it deeply challenged the official state discourse of 
denying the atrocities by publicly exposing their real extent 
(including illegal detention of individuals, transfer of preg-
nant women and illegal adoption of their newborns). The 
brutality of these acts forced several reluctant Uruguayan 
presidents to confront the issue of past crimes. In the 
words of one survivor of Operación Cóndor crimes, the 
Gelman case was “fundamental”:
From the first moment, I could see that this case would change 
the history of Uruguay on these matters, because it was the case 
of a foreigner, of a child, and moreover of a person as famous as 
Juan Gelman … I said this will change everything, and so it did.
(interview with Sara Rita Méndez, Montevideo, 8 October 2013)
1. Memory Narratives of Violence
During and after traumatic events such as dictatorship or 
violent conflict, individuals as well as social and political 
actors endeavour to make sense of and communicate these 
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distressing circumstances through narratives. There is 
never just “one memory, or a single vision and interpre-
tation of the past shared throughout society” (Jelin 2003, 
xviii). I therefore use the term “memory narratives” to 
describe the numerous interpretations, understandings, 
and evaluations of often contested facts within a country’s 
past (Lessa 2013, 19). Memory narratives emerge through 
the conscious and sustained efforts of their creators – par-
ticular individuals, institutions and organisations such as 
victims’ associations, politicians, armed opposition groups 
or the security forces – whom Argentine academic Eliza-
beth Jelin has labelled “memory entrepreneurs” (Jelin 
2003, 33–34). The existence of different memory narratives 
presupposes that social and/or political actors first enunci-
ate and then fight for them; these agents seek social recog-
nition and political legitimacy – if not hegemony – for 
their own interpretation of a contested past (Jelin 2003). 
Paraphrasing John Gillis, we can think of memory nar-
ratives as “things we think with” rather than “things we 
think about” (Gillis 1994, 5).
Memory narratives exist at the individual and collective 
levels; while originating from specific individuals and/or 
other actors, they later come to be shared by collectives and 
groups. These narratives acquire varying levels of legit-
imacy and appeal within society depending on how com-
pellingly and convincingly they portray the past, how well 
they explain the often diverse and complex facets of agency 
and responsibility for events, and how effectively they pro-
mote a particular vision of the future. Memory narratives 
are extremely dynamic. While remaining true to a core of 
constitutive elements, they evolve flexibly and adapt to new 
contexts over time. These narratives generally endure 
across decades and generations, often as long as events 
remain subject to dispute. The initial portrayal of events is 
frequently re-examined at later moments, as the contested 
facts become more distant in time; moreover, memory nar-
ratives of traumatic events are likely to persist for substan-
tial periods given their profoundly emotional 
connotations.
At any one time, some memory narratives may pre-
dominate while others may be confined to more margina-
lised positions within society; previously dominant 
narratives can later find themselves relegated to outlying 
sectors of society, while those initially least accepted may 
achieve a more dominant status and even displace pre-
viously hegemonic ones. Memory narratives are often 
latent within society but can be reactivated as a result of 
specific political or societal moments such as the Gelman 
Public Act, which prompted the resurfacing of con-
testations between different narratives and exposed the 
endurance of societal and political debates over the recent 
dictatorship in Uruguay.
War, Two Demons, or State Terrorism?
Issues of memory in Uruguay – as in most countries con-
fronting a contested past – cannot be simply reduced to a 
tension between forgetting and remembering. Instead, 
there is a multifaceted landscape of multiple memory nar-
ratives that coexist and share the same social and public 
space, offering diverse interpretations and understandings 
of the dictatorship and human rights violations. Elsewhere, 
I have identified and examined six memory narratives that 
claim to provide convincing interpretations of the recent 
past in Uruguay (Lessa 2013, chapter 6); here, I focus on 
the three that are most relevant in the context of the Public 
Act: “war”, “two demons” and “state terrorism”. These 
narratives originated four decades ago and have since 
flexibly adjusted to new political and social contexts; they 
have had varied and plentiful authors over this time, 
including the armed forces, the Tupamaros, leaders from 
across the political spectrum, human rights activists and 
victims. They are briefly described below.
The war narrative surfaced in the early 1970s, when some 
political actors perceived Uruguay as engulfed in a conflict 
(Marchesi 2002, 105–106). This narrative was enunciated at 
various moments by the armed forces, political leaders and 
the Tupamaros. Although the war possessed different con-
notations depending on who related the narrative, gen-
erally the picture was of a nation threatened by internal 
communist subversives – the Tupamaros guerrilla – while 
the military was protecting the fatherland. This narrative 
was commonly used throughout the Southern Cone to jus-
tify actions before, during and even after the dictatorship. 
In the context of the Cold War, the Uruguayan armed 
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forces saw themselves as the “guardians of the fatherland”, 
which needed to be protected against a subversive threat 
(Achugar 2005, 36). The military depicted the coup d’état 
as a consequence of armed subversion and political vac-
uum, pointing to the weakness of political parties and lib-
eral democracies in responding to communism (Heinz and 
Frühling 1999). The war narrative contended that the 
armed forces had no alternative but to confront a brutal 
enemy in a “dirty war”. Human rights abuses were excused 
in this context as inevitable during conflict. This per-
spective has held enduring appeal for several actors. For 
instance, in an open letter in 1997, some Tupamaros 
leaders – including current President of Uruguay José 
Mujica – declared how they carried “with pride the wounds 
incurred in combat” (Allier 2010, 158). More recently, in 
September 2012, well-known torturer and retired colonel 
José Gavazzo justified his past actions in terms of safe-
guarding “the security of the fatherland and of his com-
patriots” (La República 2012a).
The two demons narrative was a prevalent interpretation 
that initially emerged in Argentina in the early 1970s to 
explain the events leading to the dictatorship there (Vez-
zetti 2002). Political violence was depicted simply as a fight 
between two demons – the military and the guerrillas – 
while society was caught in the middle and suffered the 
consequences of this confrontation without being an active 
participant. In Uruguay, this narrative appeared in the early 
1980s and has been since adopted by many political and 
social actors (Demasi 2003, 67–74). The traditional Colo-
rado and Blanco parties deployed the narrative strategically 
to evade scrutiny of their role (whether action or inaction) 
in the coup, presenting the political class as helpless in this 
violent context. Importantly, broader society also endorsed 
this account, since it allowed people to demonstrate their 
misfortune and exonerate them from any responsibility – 
even though many had endorsed the military takeover as a 
solution to disorder and social unrest. Left-wing parties 
championed this narrative, given the lack of alternative dis-
courses and the fear of institutional destabilisation in the 
mid-1980s. Even the Tupamaros employed it, as it elevated 
them to “demon” status and painted them as protagonists 
of important events that had actually occurred after their 
defeat.3 The two demons narrative became the official ver-
sion of the first government of President Julio María San-
guinetti (1985–1990) and was particularly instrumental in 
justifying the adoption of parallel amnesties for political 
prisoners and military officers in the mid-1980s. The gov-
ernment skilfully used the narrative to substantiate its 
approach of looking to the future, given that society “had 
nothing to do with the fight between two intransigent 
demons”.4 The narrative’s appeal continues into the pres-
ent, especially for the military and some political leaders, 
including former presidents.
Victims and human rights groups developed an alternative 
narrative of atrocities that interpreted political violence not 
as war but as state terrorism, that is, a systematic policy of 
human rights violations perpetrated by the state. This viol-
ence unsettled the victims’ world, causing the loss and/or 
imprisonment of loved ones, forever rupturing family 
relations and producing a world of fear, horror and misery, 
particularly for the relatives of the disappeared, but also 
society as a whole. The state terrorism narrative refuted in 
particular those discourses that presented atrocities as 
inevitable during war. Human rights activists drew atten-
tion instead to the harshness of repression, emphasised that 
armed organisations had been dismantled well before the 
1973 takeover and highlighted how only a few of the vic-
tims had in fact belonged to guerrilla organisations. The 
state terrorism narrative was innovative in deploying the 
language of human rights, which was used by activists to 
articulate their demands and denounce atrocities inside 
and outside Uruguay (Markarian 2005). This narrative 
focused on disappearances (Perelli and Rial 1986), and 
stories of disappeared children, such as Macarena Gelman, 
whose identities had been illegally changed and who had 
been denied links with their biological families, had a par-
ticularly profound emotional impact on society. Since the 
electoral victory of the coalition of left-wing parties known 
3 Interview with historian Carlos Demasi, Centro 
de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayos, Facultad 
de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Uni-
versidad de la República, Montevideo, 28 August 
2008.
4 Interview with historian José Rilla, Departa-
mento de Ciencia Política, Universidad de la Repúb-
lica, Montevideo, 26 August 2008.
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as Frente Amplio in 2004, the state terrorism narrative has 
also been promulgated by politicians; for example, the text 
of the reparations law of September 2009 acknowledges the 
illegitimate conduct of the state and makes explicit refer-
ence to systematic practices of torture, forced disappear-
ance, illegal imprisonment and homicide.5
2. Truth, Justice, and Reparation in the Shadow of Operación Cóndor
Argentines María Claudia García and her husband Marcelo 
Gelman – aged nineteen and twenty – were detained at 
their home in Buenos Aires by Uruguayan and Argentine 
military officers on 24 August 1976, and subsequently held 
in the Automores Orletti clandestine detention centre, 
Operación Cóndor’s operating base in the Floresta neigh-
bourhood of Buenos Aires. Marcelo’s remains were dis-
covered in 1989 and identified by the Argentine Forensic 
Anthropology Team. In October 1976, María Claudia was 
secretly transferred to Uruguay in the so-called segundo 
vuelo6 (second flight) in an advanced state of pregnancy 
and kept captive at the headquarters of the Defence 
Information Service in Montevideo; in late October or early 
November 1976, she gave birth to a baby girl in the military 
hospital. The fate of María Claudia remains unknown; she 
is likely to have been taken to another military site, the Val-
paraíso Base, where she was murdered and buried in a clan-
destine cemetery (Dutrénit Bielous 2012, 85).
Juan Gelman, Marcelo’s father, spent over two decades 
looking for his disappeared grandchild. Gelman followed 
several leads about the baby’s possible fate and location, 
concluding that he or she was in Montevideo. A team of 
Uruguayan journalists from La República, including 
Gabriel Mazzarovich, undertook a parallel investigation 
that led them to the same conclusion. In May 1999,7 Gel-
man requested the cooperation of Uruguay’s government 
in his pursuit, meeting with Elías Bluth, the secretary of 
President Sanguinetti, but received no help (Demasi and 
Yaffé 2005). Some months later, in October 1999, Gelman 
wrote an open letter to Sanguinetti asking why he was 
remaining silent regarding the disappeared child, while 
thousands of intellectuals and Nobel laureates across the 
globe also lobbied Sanguinetti in support of the poet’s 
request. Sanguinetti remained obstinate and claimed that, 
despite investigations by his government, there was no 
indication that either Gelman’s daughter-in-law or his 
grandchild were in Uruguay; Sanguinetti even asserted that 
no child had disappeared “on Uruguayan soil” (La Repúb-
lica 2000). President Sanguinetti also accused the poet of 
running a campaign to portray him as “indifferent” and 
“insensitive” to humanitarian demands (Allier 2010, 187). 
In March 2000, newly elected president Jorge Batlle 
(2000–2005) announced that Gelman’s granddaughter 
Macarena had been found in Montevideo where she had 
been raised by the family of a police chief.8 Macarena and 
her grandfather were finally reunited.
The Gelman case constituted a “turning point” in account-
ability, amounting to a “brutal first rupture in the collective 
imaginary of the past in Uruguay” according to journalist 
Mazzarovich:
The discourses of impunity and all the lies crumbled, the truth 
turned out to be much worse than the activists’ claims: the 
armed forces had even stolen babies! The logic of war was 
destroyed. How did the kidnapping of babies fit into the scen-
arios of battle depicted by the security forces?
(interview with Gabriel Mazzarovich, Montevideo,  
1 October 2013)
The explosion of the Gelman case enabled further investi-
gations into the past, especially the realisation that Uru-
guayan citizens previously thought to have disappeared in 
Buenos Aires had in fact been kidnapped by Uruguayan 
armed forces, illegally returned to Uruguay, and dis-
appeared. Juan Gelman and Macarena have since focused 
their efforts on locating María Claudia’s remains and 
obtaining justice. Batlle’s government proved unsuppor-
5 Ley N. 18.596 de 18 de setiembre de 2009. 
http://basejuridica.cgn.gub.uy/WEBAKA/Enlaces/
Ley_%2018596.html
6 Uruguayan nationals detained in Buenos Aires 
were secretly transferred to Montevideo on clandes-
tine Uruguayan Air Force flights on 24 July and 5 
October 1976. While all those transferred on the first 
flight survived, those on the second did not.
7 Interview with journalist Gabriel Mazzarovich, 
Montevideo, 1 October 2013.
8 Ángel Tauriño – a high-ranking police chief – 
had strong links with the Colorado party and in par-
ticular with President Sanguinetti, who had nomi-
nated him as head of police of the Department of 
San José (R. Rodríguez 2012).
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tive; in June 2002, Gelman filed a criminal case in Mon-
tevideo concerning the detention and disappearance of 
María Claudia, the abduction of her newborn daughter, 
and the illegal alteration of Macarena’s identity. The case 
was closed in November 2003 when the executive applied 
the amnesty law to end proceedings.9 In June 2005, Gel-
man’s attorney attempted to reopen the investigation by 
providing new evidence but again this did not prosper. 
Despite these failed endeavours, Macarena also sought to 
have the criminal investigation reopened in August 2008 
but, even after it eventually resumed, progress was 
extremely slow (Peralta 2011).
As a result of these denials of justice, Macarena and Juan 
Gelman lodged a petition against Uruguay with the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in May 2006, 
represented by lawyers from the Center for Justice and 
International Law (CEJIL). The complainants deplored 
that their right to access to justice had been violated and 
emphasised the personal suffering caused to them by Uru-
guay’s failure to investigate the facts and prosecute and 
punish those responsible through the systematic appli-
cation of the Ley de Caducidad. In July 2008, the Commis-
sion recommended that Uruguay investigate and punish 
those responsible, pay full reparations to the victims, and 
render the Ley de Caducidad without effect. By December 
2009, Uruguay had yet to comply with these recom-
mendations, and the Commission thus referred the case to 
the Inter-American Court in January 2010. In line with its 
previous jurisprudence,10 deeming amnesties for human 
rights violations to be incompatible with obligations under 
the American Convention on Human Rights, the Court in 
February 2011 declared the Ley de Caducidad invalid, 
because it was incompatible with the American Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Inter-American Con-
vention on Forced Disappearance of Persons since the law 
obstructed the investigation and possible sanctioning of 
individuals responsible for grave human rights violations. 
Among the judgement’s recommendations, the Inter-
American Court requested Uruguay to conduct a public act 
of acknowledgment of international responsibility, which 
was to address the violations dealt with in the judgment 
and “take place in a public ceremony carried out by high-
ranking national authorities and in the presence of the vic-
tims” (IACtHR 2011, para. 266).
3. The 2012 Public Act
On 21 March 2012, in the Uruguayan parliament, President 
José Mujica (2010–15) appeared before senators, deputies, 
the commanders of the armed forces, judges of the 
Supreme Court of Justice, government ministers, Juan and 
Macarena Gelman, as well as representatives from civil 
society and victims groups, to acknowledge Uruguay’s 
international responsibility in the Gelman case in a public 
ceremony. Mujica read out a carefully worded text, drafted 
and agreed by the government together with Macarena and 
her lawyers. The Act was limited to the events of the Gel-
man case, in line with the judgement and as agreed 
between the parties (López San Miguel 2012; Mazzarovich 
2012). The president, as the only speaker in a short cer-
emony lasting less than 20 minutes, acknowledged Uru-
guay’s responsibility and the need for reparations for the 
abuses suffered by the Gelmans.
At a press conference held immediately afterwards, Uru-
guay’s foreign minister Luis Almagro labelled the Public 
Act “a milestone in the history of the country”, since it 
reaffirmed Uruguay’s commitment to the full applicability 
of human rights and to the recovery of memory, truth, and 
justice.11 Macarena Gelman stressed how the ceremony was 
neither “the beginning nor end of anything” but marked 
an important point from which “something better could be 
built”. She asserted that “the path ahead” was uphill, since 
much remained to be done (Montevideo-Portal 2012a). 
9 Law 15.848 of December 1986, Ley de Caduci-
dad de la Pretensión Punitiva del Estado, ended the 
possibility of judicial proceedings against military 
and police officers accused of human rights viol-
ations during the dictatorship. For more 
information on the law see Lessa (2012).
10 See for instance verdicts such as those in the 
Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Interpretation of the 
Judgment of the Merits. Judgment of March 14, 
2001. Series C No. 83 and the Case of Gomes Lund 
et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil. Pre-
liminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. 
Judgment of November 24, 2010. Series C No. 219.
11 See “Esta ceremonia no marca el principio o fin 
de nada pero hace más fácil el camino”, 21 March 
2013, http://presidencia.gub.uy/wps/wcm/connect/
Presidencia/PortalPresidencia/Comunicacion/
comunicacionNoticias/conferencia-prensa-
macarena-gelman (accessed 31 December 2013).
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CEJIL, which had litigated the case at the Inter-American 
level on behalf of the Gelmans, emphasised that the Public 
Act constituted “a definite step forward on the path 
towards truth, justice and redress” not only for the Gel-
mans but for all the victims (CEJIL 2012). Most politicians 
regarded the Public Act as “correct”, with Senator Fran-
cisco Gallinal stating that it was “simple and without fuss” 
in addition to being “fair and necessary” (Montevideo-
Portal 2012c).
The Public Act was carefully planned and organised by the 
government, in an attempt to bring together different 
political and social actors – albeit eventually unsuccessfully. 
The president’s speech emphasised that the Public Act was 
carried out to “strictly comply with the international ver-
dict”.12 Unlike the emotional delivery of President Patricio 
Aylwin, who asked for forgiveness for dictatorship crimes 
in Chile in his inaugural speech in 1990, President Mujica 
hardly displayed any emotion and strictly observed the 
agreed protocol of the event.13 The “decorous, adequate, 
yet cautious”14 act fulfilled the requirement of taking 
responsibility for the crimes requested by the Inter-
American Court and was also a tribute to Juan Gelman’s 
“tireless struggle”.15 The governing Frente Amplio coalition 
contended that, while the Public Act was directly linked to 
the specific case of the Gelmans, “it should be interpreted 
as having a broader scope”, assuming responsibility for the 
darkest period in Uruguay’s history and calling on people 
to work together “in the search for truth and justice” 
(Montevideo-Portal 2012b). Some scholars and human 
rights activists nevertheless saw in the Public Act further 
proof of the government’s faltering and timid policy when 
dealing with the crimes of the recent past.16 For instance, 
historian Aldo Marchesi highlighted the approach of 
“doing less than what could be done”17 that has char-
acterised the last several years of Frente Amplio govern-
ments and their reluctance to engage with the issue of 
accountability for past crimes. Others underscored how the 
government could have taken advantage of this oppor-
tunity to acknowledge all of the dictatorship’s human 
rights violations and not only the Gelman case. Civil 
society groups were also dissatisfied. For example, Valentín 
Enseñat from HIJOS Uruguay (an association of sons and 
daughters of the disappeared) questioned the state’s atti-
tude of just “complying with an international obligation” 
and hoped for further reflections and discussions within 
the government and the political system. According to 
Enseñat, the government lacked the political will to com-
mit to the search for truth and justice and called for a dif-
ferent mind-set from the executive to replace endeavours 
“to close down the matter as soon as possible” (Zecca 
2012).
3.1. Acknowledgment or Forgiveness?
The Public Act triggered the resurfacing of memory debates 
well before the scheduled date, and speculation abounded 
in the media between January and March 2012. The act 
produced an irruption of memories in Uruguay, reactivat-
ing and re-evoking decades-old tensions and arguments 
about a recent political past still very much present within 
society. The Act related closely to a controversial period in 
the country’s history and provided a significant backdrop 
for potential memory struggles. Was it going to be – or 
should it be – an expression of forgiveness? Where should it 
be held? Were the military commanders and former presi-
dents going to be invited? Would the Act relate to the Gel-
man case only or to all victims of the dictatorship?
One of the issues that attracted particular media attention 
and generated much discussion was whether or not the 
state should ask for forgiveness for the crimes committed. 
Some newspapers reported that Alberto Breccia, President 
Mujica’s secretary at the time, had raised the question of 
forgiveness. However, Breccia criticised the media for label-
ling the event “a forgiveness act” (Montevideo-Portal 
2012d). In early March 2012, President Mujica made it 
12 Interview with José Luis González, lawyer for 
the Gelman family, Montevideo, 22 March 2012.
13 Videos of the Public Act (https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=s9osFrV2cVk) and Aylwin’s message 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V6cRI75IBBI) 
are worth comparing.
14 Interview with members of the Peace and Jus-
tice Service NGO (SERPAJ), Montevideo, March 21, 
2012.
15 Interview with José Luis González, see note 12.
16 Interview with Pablo Chargoñia, human rights 
lawyer, Montevideo, 12 March 2012.
17 Interview with historian Aldo Marchesi, Centro 
de Estudios Interdisciplinarios Uruguayos, Facultad 
de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, Uni-
versidad de la República, Montevideo, 14 March 
2012.
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clear in his typical down-to-earth style that he did not like 
the idea at all because forgiveness was a subjective territory 
of things inside people (L. Rodríguez 2012, 10). Mujica 
underlined how the Act was not going to mark a definitive 
moment, “neither a before nor after”, and that it just 
meant complying “in good faith” with a juridical verdict 
that Uruguay was obliged to obey (Cajal 2012). The Gel-
man family also entered this discussion with Juan Gelman 
noting that “no victim” had delegated to third parties “the 
power to forgive in their name” (Montevideo-Portal 
2012a); Macarena declared that forgiveness was never con-
templated in the Gelman ruling and was something mainly 
discussed in the media. In her opinion, forgiveness was “an 
individual and voluntarily matter”, and she doubted that 
“a top-down imposed act of forgiveness” would have any 
value (Mazzarovich 2012). Macarena said that “she had not 
seen any sign of repentance from those responsible for hor-
rors and therefore an act of forgiveness would be meaning-
less” (El Observador 2012b). The lack of cooperation and 
provision of information about the crimes in question, she 
pointed out in a TV interview, clearly demonstrated the 
absence of the preconditions for forgiveness.18 Victims’ and 
human rights organisations shared Macarena’s view. Val-
entín Enseñat asserted that forgiveness was inappropriate 
at that particular moment since “the state continued to 
perpetrate the crime of disappearance” and “some form of 
repentance by the material authors” was yet to be seen (La 
Diaria 2012, 12). The head of the National Human Rights 
Secretariat, Javier Miranda – the son of a disappeared per-
son – underlined the complexity of forgiveness, especially 
for the victims’ relatives: “[I]t is not that we are unwilling 
to forgive, but it is an individual, subjective decision in 
each case” (L. Rodríguez 2012, 10). These statements make 
it clear that the Gelman family and the broader group of 
victims of human rights violations in Uruguay concur that 
the prerequisites for a genuine process of forgiveness are 
still lacking: the state and the direct perpetrators of atroc-
ities have yet to show genuine remorse for their actions 
and, in particular, take the steps necessary to shed light on 
the fate of victims of enforced disappearance.
3.2. Enduring Memory and Justice Struggles
Several factors, relating both to the Gelman case and to 
broader issues of memory and accountability, created a 
context in which the Public Act easily reactivated memory 
struggles about the recent past. First, the Public Act took 
place in an emotionally charged context: a few days earlier 
the remains of a disappeared person had been found 
buried in a clandestine grave on the grounds of the 14th 
Infantry Battalion in the province of Canelones, just out-
side of the capital Montevideo. Such discoveries always 
have a profound impact on Uruguayan society. The 
remains were discovered within the context of ongoing 
investigations into María Claudia’s disappearance and were 
later identified as being those of Ricardo Blanco Valiente, 
disappeared in 1978. Furthermore, in October 2011, Judge 
Pedro Salazar had begun the prosecution of five policemen 
and military officers held responsible for María Claudia’s 
murder.
Second, memories of the recent dictatorship remain fresh 
within society despite the passing of time. For over two 
decades, governments attempted to silence discussion of 
dictatorship crimes and restrict it to the sphere of human 
rights activists, victims and relatives. Sanguinetti’s sig-
nature slogan “no hay que tener los ojos en la nuca” (you 
should not have eyes at the back of your head), exhorting 
people to focus on the future rather than looking back to 
the past, epitomised this endeavour (Lessa 2011). But the 
memories of state violence could not easily be suppressed 
and endured within society, waiting to resurface at any 
moment. During the 1980s and 1990s, victims’ memories 
were politically invisible but persisted in the intimate 
spaces of private homes and families (Fried 2011). Despite 
the absence of any space in the political and social spheres 
for talking about past horrors, memory narratives perse-
vered and could easily be activated at specific instances 
such as the Public Act and anniversaries such as the annual 
march of silence on 20 May that commemorates slain Uru-
guayan politicians Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez-
Ruiz as well as all victims of enforced disappearance. The 
18 Entrevista a Macarena Gelman, 5 March 2012, 
Monte Carlo TV Channel, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=03Hzj_WP0Q8
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endurance of these traumatic memories is an unintended 
outcome of the intrinsic features of state terrorism and the 
institutionalisation of fear during the dictatorship. Uru-
guayan psychoanalysts Marcelo and Maren Viñar have 
highlighted the consequences of state political terror on 
victims and society: the tearing apart of the social fabric 
and the alteration of culture, social interactions, and com-
munities (Viñar and Viñar 1993).
Third, the Public Act took place in the aftermath of the 
first ruling against Uruguay by the Inter-American Court. 
Furthermore, the verdict came against the backdrop of an 
intense political situation: throughout 2010 and 2011 the 
government and the political establishment had been 
endeavouring to respond to past crimes, albeit ultimately 
unsuccessfully. Since the late 1990s, the question of 
coming to terms with dictatorship crimes had slowly 
begun re-emerging in Uruguay after many years of official 
silence and denial. Unlike Argentina or Chile, Uruguay 
had, after the transition to democracy in the mid-1980s, 
embarked on a path of impunity whose clearest embodi-
ment was the Ley de Caducidad (Lessa 2013, chapter 5). 
Every president between 1986 and 2005 systematically 
applied this amnesty law to obstruct all investigations into 
past atrocities, including in the Gelman case. Eduardo 
Galeano famously labelled Uruguay “a paradise of impun-
ity” (La República 2008). Yet a vibrant and heterogeneous 
coalition of civil society groups – ranging from the 
relatives of the disappeared to the students’ federation and 
the trade unions – pushed incessantly and creatively for 
more accountability and challenged the institutional-
isation of impunity.19 Eventually, in August 2000, the gov-
ernment of Colorado president Jorge Batlle (2000–05) 
established the first mechanism to investigate disappear-
ances, a type of truth commission named the Comisión 
para la Paz (Peace Commission), which officially acknowl-
edged the perpetration of atrocities by state agents (Allier 
2006).
In March 2005 the left-wing Frente Amplio coalition, 
which had previously championed accountability, took 
over the government. Civil society and victims’ groups 
have exploited the fact that the new government has been 
slightly more receptive to their demands. Important prog-
ress was achieved under the governments of Tabaré Váz-
quez (2005–10) and José Mujica (2010–15), including 
reparation policies for victims, excavations at military sites 
leading to the identification of four bodies of disappeared 
persons in 2005, 2011 and 2012; a partial opening of state 
archives, with information disseminated and used in crimi-
nal proceedings; a new interpretation and application of 
the Ley de Caducidad that at last allowed prosecutions for 
past crimes to move forward;20 and the overturning of the 
amnesty by parliament in October 2011 (Lessa 2012). 
Between 2009 and 2011 debates surrounding the overturn-
ing of the Ley de Caducidad resulted in tense political con-
frontations with the opposition, but they also exposed 
disagreements and different perspectives on the matter 
within the government. The governing coalition’s frag-
mentations and divisions on what to do with the Ley de 
Caducidad were already evident in the 2009 plebiscite on 
whether or not to annul the amnesty as well as in the 
unsuccessful attempts between 2010 and 2011 to have par-
liament pass a law reinterpreting the amnesty to avoid the 
looming condemnatory verdict by the Inter-American 
Court (Lessa 2013, chapter 5).
By the time of the Public Act, the governing Frente Amplio 
coalition had been internally weakened and divided by this 
complex process of removing the Ley de Caducidad from 
the statute book. The twists and turns of efforts to overturn 
the amnesty law had exposed the government’s lack of a 
19 These included a referendum to overturn the 
Ley de Caducidad in 1989 and a plebiscite in 2009; 
the 1989 Nunca Más report on the dictatorship’s 
crimes compiled by the NGO SERPAJ; a con-
stitutionality appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice 
in 1986 (and again in 2008 and 2009); civil cases 
against the state for damages suffered by victims of 
detention and disappearance in the early 1990s; 
public street mobilisations since 1996 – marchas del 
silencio – to commemorate the disappeared; and in 
2002 the first successful criminal prosecution against 
a dictatorship-era foreign minister Juan Carlos 
Blanco (Lessa 2013, 138 ff.).
20 For up-to-date information on judicial investi-
gations into dictatorship atrocities see the website of 
the Observatorio Luz Ibarburu: http://beta.observ-
atorioluzibarburu.org/reportes/. Events in the early 
months of 2013 – the transfer by the Supreme Court 
of Justice of criminal judge Mariana Mota who was 
investigating almost fifty cases of past crimes to a 
civil jurisdiction and several sentences by that same 
court closing down investigations applying a statute 
of limitations – constitute worrisome developments 
deeply questioning the country’s commitment to 
accountability (Lessa and Le-Goff 2013).
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clear-cut and consistent policy on accountability. The 
immediate context of the Public Act was thus characterised 
by the aftershocks and consequences of these recent events. 
Moreover, the Public Act and the president’s speech must 
be placed in a long-term context of sustained struggles 
against impunity by civil society groups on the one hand 
and an often reluctant political establishment having to 
respond to these pressures on the other. The Public Act 
quickly reignited the embers of the political and memory 
debates.
3.3. Memory Narratives and Contested Visions of the Past
The symbolism of the Public Act was inescapable and, 
because of that, it had the potential to trigger heated politi-
cal discussions. The main speaker, President Mujica, had 
been a Tupamaros leader in the 1960s and 1970s; at the 
time of the Act, he was Uruguay’s head of state and, in that 
capacity, also the commander of its armed forces – his old 
“enemies”. Mujica led the Act in an emblematic place, par-
liament, whose closure had signalled the start of the dicta-
torship on 27 June 1973, after which it remained shut for 
twelve years. Mujica acknowledged state responsibility for 
the crimes committed against the relatives of Juan Gelman, 
who was also a member of revolutionary armed groups in 
Argentina. Juan Gelman highlighted the historical paradox 
embodied in the Public Act, since President Mujica – him-
self a victim of the dictatorship – had to recognise in the 
name of the state the responsibility of his victimisers; Gel-
man underscored the president’s “moral courage” (La 
República 2013, 7).21
President Mujica’s speech at the Public Act clearly reflected 
the state terrorism narrative. Although he was a reluctant 
participant, the text he read out marked an unprecedented 
step when compared to the language employed by his pre-
decessors – none of whom had used the term “state terror-
ism”. Mujica used this expression several times, and also 
cited other constitutive elements of that narrative, such as 
explicit mention of “enforced disappearances”, “illegal 
detentions”, and “rights” (Scagliola 2012, 2). He recounted 
in detail the crimes perpetrated against María Claudia and 
Macarena and also recalled the historical context of the 
time, underscoring how hundreds more people were also 
victims of state-sponsored atrocities analogous to those 
suffered by the Gelmans:
[U]nder the aegis of the so-called Doctrine of National Secur-
ity, a systematic policy of repression of social and political organi-
sations, as well as the trade unions was carried out along with 
the persecution of its members and the control of the whole civil 
society, all expressions of so-called “state terrorism”.
(Mujica cited in SERPAJ 2012, 57; emphasis added)
Furthermore, the president acknowledged the existence of 
Operación Cóndor, which resulted in the persecution, 
detention, murder and disappearance of citizens of 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay 
even when in exile in South America. In a clear reference to 
the state terrorism narrative and the emblematic crime of 
disappearance, it was acknowledged that the whereabouts 
and fate of many people remained “unknown”, while their 
“remains were yet to be found” (SERPAJ 2012, 57).
Uruguay’s failure to fulfil its obligations to investigate and 
punish these crimes was not limited to the authoritarian 
period, the president admitted, but stretched into the 
democratic era when impunity was consolidated in the Ley 
de Caducidad. Mujica highlighted how the interpretation 
and application of that law had resulted in the violation of 
judicial protection and judicial guarantees for the victims 
because of the absence of effective investigations and the 
lack of prosecutions of those responsible for the crimes 
(SERPAJ 2012, 58). In addition to recognising its inter-
national juridical and ethical responsibility, Uruguay con-
demned the atrocities and reaffirmed its commitment to 
justice and to avoiding any repetition of such events; the 
government vowed to continue looking for the body of 
Macarena’s mother and to prosecute those responsible for 
her murder.
21 Mujica was one of several Tupamaros leaders 
detained as hostages for over a decade by the dicta-
torship, remaining under constant threat of execu-
tion throughout his imprisonment.
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The carefully crafted speech attempted to build a political 
consensus in the aftermath of very tense months in 2010 
and 2011. In particular, Mujica stated that he “did not want 
to go a millimetre beyond” what would be bearable for 
those who had a different opinion (Scagliola 2012, 3). 
However, as the following examples illustrate, the president 
was unable to bring Uruguayans together and generate a 
consensus. Instead the Public Act produced a flurry of 
criticism and elicited abundant political polemics from 
media outlets and opposition politicians, who took advan-
tage of this opportunity to reaffirm and rehearse their con-
tending memory narratives of the past, especially the war 
and two demons narratives.
An editorial in the conservative El País newspaper in Janu-
ary 2012 called for the adoption of a complete vision, 
encompassing “all human rights violations perpetrated in 
our country both by the military and the Tupamaros” (El 
País 2012; emphasis added). The editorial underlined the 
impunity enjoyed by many guerrillas and listed crimes they 
committed such as robberies and kidnappings for ransom, 
cold-blooded executions of their enemies as well as traitors 
in their own ranks, illegal detentions, and use of torture by 
joint military and guerrilla task-forces during a phase of 
cooperation, labelling them “sinister episodes”. The edi-
torial condemned state terrorism but also pointed to the 
responsibility of “those who sinned with impunity to 
impose on their compatriots a socialist Cuban-style 
regime” and inaugurated an “era of violence that under-
mined our democratic system” (El País 2012).
An editorial in the Colorado weekly Correo de los Viernes 
similarly drew on the war and demons narratives to cat-
egorise the military takeover as a “dramatic culmination of 
a process of political violence begun by the Tupamaros in 
1963”; equating the violence perpetrated by state agents 
with that of non-state armed groups served to justify the 
existence of parallel amnesty laws covering political 
prisoners and guerrillas in 1985 and the Ley de Caducidad 
for military and police officers in 1986. The editorial argued 
that the guerrillas renounced democracy to gain power 
through armed struggle and warned against falsifying his-
tory by talking of “one form of violence without making 
reference to the other” (Correo de los Viernes 2012). Recal-
ling the (ab)use of memory and forgetting, it accused the 
former guerrillas of wishing to hide their “tragic conduct 
and their responsibility for the country’s destabilisation”, to 
install “a formidable historical misrepresentation involving 
moral hemiplegia, a dual ethic that both exposes and hides” 
(Correo de los Viernes 2012). In a similar vein, former 
ambassador Adolfo Castells Mendívil, in a note entitled 
“The Forgiveness’ Show”, accused the government of taking 
advantage of the opportunity offered by the Public Act “to 
misrepresent history, by ratifying the lies printed in some 
textbooks” and considered it “surreal” that a state whose 
government was composed of former guerrillas would 
assume responsibility for crimes of the dictatorship that 
they caused, without ever having acknowledged their own 
responsibility (Castells Mendívil 2012). An article in the 
weekly Blanco magazine La Patria likewise called on Presi-
dent Mujica and “his Tupamaros” to ask for forgiveness for 
attacking the state, “kidnapping, torturing, and murdering 
people to impose their ideas” (Patrón 2012).
Three former presidents (Sanguinetti, Lacalle and Batlle) 
turned down their invitations to attend the Public Act and 
went to extreme lengths to condemn it. Batlle used the war 
narrative to contend that “the Tupamaros guerrillas should 
be the ones asking for forgiveness”, arguing that “if there 
had been no guerrillas, there would not have been a mili-
tary dictatorship” (El Observador 2012a). In an interesting 
twist of the two demons narrative, Batlle proclaimed a 
“one demon” narrative, attributing responsibility for what 
had happened exclusively to the Tupamaros: institutional 
breakdown, dictatorship and state terrorism (Guillot 
2012). Former Blanco president Luis Alberto Lacalle 
(1990–95) employed the war interpretation to affirm that 
“Tupamaros authorities […] that attacked national democ-
racy from 1963 should ask […] for forgiveness for the 
murders, kidnappings and thefts that they perpetrated” 
(Lacalle 2012). Former president Sanguinetti went even 
further, accusing the government of “witch-burning” and 
of being the “Inquisition”. He highlighted the existence of 
a partial vision of the past that condemned “the excesses of 
the military” but ignored “the crimes of the guerrilla”, 
even though the latter were responsible for plunging the 
country into violence and “forcing the army out of their 
barracks” (Sanguinetti 2012).
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Colorado deputy Fernando Amado acknowledged a “ter-
rible crime committed by state agents”, but also remarked 
that Mujica could contribute to reconciliation by publicly 
admitting his mistakes (Rodríguez and Rómboli 2012). 
The voice of the armed forces was also inevitably present. 
The president of the Military Club, Guillermo Cedrés, 
resorted to the war narrative to assert that the military had 
been following politicians’ orders and had no reason to 
apologise. While any “errors or crimes” perpetrated would 
be prosecuted, “all the actors involved” in the events 
should ask for forgiveness, pointing to what he labelled 
Mujica’s “double character, as president and former terror-
ist” (Ultimas Noticias 2012a). Finally, the NGO Madres y 
Familiares de Uruguayos Detenidos Desaparecidos (Associ-
ation of Mothers and Relatives of the Disappeared) under-
lined the persistent lack of recognition by the army of the 
events that occurred during the dictatorship and criticised 
the way many military and political actors continued to 
employ the war logic and the two demons theory to inter-
pret the past (Ultimas Noticias 2012b).
The analysis of debates surrounding the Public Act exposes 
continuities but also changes and reinterpretations of the 
three memory narratives. Regarding the state terrorism 
narrative, the transnational coordination of terror through 
Operación Cóndor occupied a central place in the Public 
Act’s speech. This is an important change that came about 
not only because the crimes perpetrated against the Gel-
mans occurred within that context, but also because sub-
stantial information on this terror network has been 
emerging over the past ten years. This information – in 
particular on the use of clandestine flights to return Uru-
guayans detained in Buenos Aires to Montevideo – clearly 
questions earlier accounts of Uruguayans that had been 
disappeared on Argentine soil by the dictatorship there, 
pointing instead clearly to Uruguay’s direct role in their 
persecution as well as its active participation in the trans-
national network of repression. The war and two demons 
narratives were also re-actualised in the current political 
context. In particular, there has been a move towards a 
“one demon narrative”, over-emphasising the role played 
by the Tupamaros in the onset of the dictatorship, the 
attacks against democracy, and the perpetration of violent 
crimes. This attempt to shift the blame from the two 
demons to focus almost exclusively on one of them is 
intentional and serves political goals, since the main party 
within the governing coalition is the Movimiento de Par-
ticipación Popular, established in 1989 by ex-Tupamaros 
leaders. This spotlight on the guerrillas and calls to inte-
grate the responsibility of armed groups into the historical 
narrative are instrumentalised by the opposition to criticise 
the government and its policies in dealing with the past. 
Taking advantage of President Mujica’s past as a former 
Tupamaros leader, the opposition launched into a broader 
critique of the governing party’s approach to accountabil-
ity, accusing it of partiality and of championing “hemi-
plegic visions” of the past that do not correspond to reality. 
This reinterpretation of the war and demons narratives 
purposely avoids any discussion of the difference between 
terror coming from the state – which is tasked with pro-
tecting human rights – and that coming from non-state 
armed groups. In Uruguay, thousands of guerrilla members 
were in fact prosecuted by military tribunals during the 
dictatorship and spent time in prison, while only a handful 
of state agents have been tried since the transition in the 
mid-1980s.
4. Conclusion
La oveja negra 
pace en el campo negro 
sobre la nieve negra 
bajo la noche negra 
junto a la ciudad negra 
donde lloro vestido de rojo.22
(La República 2012b, 6)
Juan Gelman read this short poem, written decades earlier 
by his son Marcelo, at a private ceremony on the day of the 
Public Act during which a memorial plaque was unveiled 
in the Defence Information Service building in Mon-
tevideo to commemorate María Claudia and Macarena, as 
22 The black sheep/grazes in the black field/on the 
black snow/under the dark night/next to the black 
city/where I cry dressed in red.
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well as all others incarcerated in that clandestine detention 
centre during the dictatorship. Marcelo’s poem sounds like 
a sinister foreboding of his own death and of the dreadful 
fate suffered by his wife and unborn baby daughter, while 
also forewarning events on a national and international 
scale, as Argentina and Uruguay both lived through “the 
dark night” of dictatorship and state terrorism.
The Public Act ordered by the Inter-American Court in the 
Gelman case symbolically commemorated the victims and 
constituted a form of reparation, since Uruguay officially 
acknowledged its responsibility for atrocities. The organi-
sation and unfolding of the Act had reverberations and 
repercussions in the wider society and political landscapes. 
The Public Act triggered the re-emergence of latent 
struggles between competing memory narratives relating 
to the dictatorship and the human rights violations as well 
as their re-interpretation within the contemporary setting. 
The state terrorism narrative and interpretation of past 
events has over the past several years achieved a more 
dominant position within the social and political land-
scape. This memory narrative was expressed and reaf-
firmed in the speech by President Mujica during the Public 
Act, when he utilised some of the narrative’s essential 
elements such as the systematic policy of violations imple-
mented by the state and the emblematic crime of enforced 
disappearance. In spite of its recently acquired dominant 
status, the state terrorism narrative did not go uncontested. 
Rather, the Public Act triggered numerous irruptions of 
memory in Uruguay, reactivating and reaffirming compet-
ing memory narratives that interpreted the years of the dic-
tatorship as a time of war fought between the two demons. 
These narratives were mainly articulated by opposition 
leaders from the Blanco and Colorado parties; two former 
presidents offered a new interpretation, amounting to a 
“one demon” narrative, shifting the focus exclusively onto 
the Tupamaros guerrillas and holding them alone respon-
sible for the dictatorship and ensuing violence.
Four decades on from the 1973 coup d’état, there still are 
conflicting and diverse memory narratives in Uruguay that 
compete to interpret and explain the violence before and 
during the dictatorship. The Public Act in its reparative and 
symbolic connotations worked as a trigger to reactivate 
quiescent memory narratives in Uruguay. Despite the pas-
sing of time, the dispute over the past remains very much 
alive and is likely to persist into the future, along with the 
enduring search for justice by Juan and Macarena Gelman. 
As William Faulkner famously asserted (1953): “The past is 
never dead. In fact, it’s not even past.”
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